We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as long as users do not anticipate the effect of their actions on prices, a simple proportional pricing mechanism can maximize the sum of users' utilities minus the cost (called aggregate surplus). Continuing previous efforts to quantify the effects of selfish behavior in network pricing mechanisms, we consider the possibility that users anticipate the effect of their actions on link prices. Under the assumption that the links' marginal cost functions are convex, we establish existence of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium is no worse than a factor of 4 2 5 times the optimal aggregate surplus; thus, the efficiency loss when users are selfish is no more than approximately 34%.
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T HE current Internet is used by a widely heterogeneous population of users; not only are different types of traffic sharing the same network, but different end users place different values on their perceived network performance. This has led to a surge of interest in congestion pricing, where the network is treated as a market, and prices are set to mediate demand and supply of network resources; see, e.g., [1] and [2] .
We investigate a specific price mechanism considered by Kelly et al. in [3] (motivated by the proposal made in [4] ). For simplicity, let us first consider the special case of a single link; in this case the mechanism works as follows. Each user submits a bid, or total willingness-to-pay, to the link manager. This represents the total amount the user expects to pay. The link manager then chooses a total rate and price such that the product of price and rate is equal to the sum of the bids, and the price is equal to marginal cost; note, in particular, that the supply of the link is elastic, i.e., it is not fixed in advance. Finally, each user receives a fraction of the allocated rate in proportion to their bid. It is shown in [3] that if users do not anticipate the effect of their bid on the price, such a scheme maximizes the sum of users' utilities minus the cost of the total allocated rate, known as the aggregate surplus (see [5, Ch. 10] ).
The pricing mechanism of [3] takes as input the bids of the users, and produces as output the price of the link, and the resulting rate allocation to the users. Kelly et al. [3] continue on to discuss distributed algorithms for implementation of this market-clearing process: given the bids of the users, the authors present two algorithms which converge to the market-clearing price and rate allocation. Indeed, much of the interest in this market mechanism stems from its desirable properties as a decentralized system, including both stability and scalability. For details, we refer the reader to [6] - [9] .
One important interpretation of the price given to users in the algorithms of [3] is that it can provide early notification of congestion. Building on the explicit congestion notification (ECN) proposal [10] , this interpretation suggests that the network might charge users proactively, in hopes of avoiding congestion later. From an implementation standpoint, such a shift implies that rather than a hard capacity constraint (i.e., a link is overloaded when the rate through it exceeds the capacity of the link), the link has an elastic capacity (i.e., the link gradually begins to signal a buildup of congestion before the link's true capacity is actually met). Many proposals have been made for "active queue management" (AQM) to achieve good performance with ECN; see, e.g., [11] - [14] . This issue is of secondary importance to our discussion, as we do not concern ourselves with the specific interpretation of the cost function at the link. (An insightful discussion of the relationship between active queue management and the cost function of the link may be found in [15] .)
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of the market mechanism of [3] when users attempt to manipulate the market. Formally, we consider a model where users anticipate the effects of their actions on the link prices. This makes the model a game, and we ask two fundamental questions. First, does a Nash equilibrium exist for this game? And second, how inefficient is such an equilibrium relative to the maximal aggregate surplus? We show that Nash equilibria exist, and that the efficiency loss is no more than a factor of the maximal aggregate surplus (approximately 34%) when users are price anticipating.
Such an investigation forms part of a broader body of work on quantifying efficiency loss in environments where participants are selfish. Results have been obtained for routing [16] - [18] , traffic networks [19] , [20] and network design problems [21] , [22] . Our work is most closely related to that of [23] , where the 0018-9286/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE same market mechanism as in this paper was considered for the case where the supply of a link is fixed, or inelastic; this was the mechanism first presented in [4] . Johari and Tsitsiklis show the efficiency loss when users are price anticipating is no worse than 25% [23] .
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. We consider a single link in isolation; extensions to general networks are discussed in [24] . In Section I, we describe the market mechanism for a single link, and recapitulate the results of Kelly et al. [3] . In Section II, we describe a game where users are price anticipating, and establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy vector to be a Nash equilibrium. These conditions are used in Section III to prove the main result of the paper for a single link: That when users are price anticipating, the efficiency loss-that is, the loss in aggregate surplus relative to the maximum-is no more than 34%.
In Section IV, we compare the settings of inelastic and elastic supply. In particular, we consider a limit of cost functions which approach a hard capacity constraint. We show that if these cost functions are monomials and we let the exponent tend to infinity, then the efficiency loss approaches 25%, which is consistent with the result of [23] . Some conclusions are offered in Section V.
I. BACKGROUND
Suppose users share a single communication link. Let denote the rate allocated to user . We assume that user receives a utility equal to if the allocated rate is . In addition, we let denote the total rate allocated at the link, and let denote the cost incurred at the link when the total allocated rate is . We will assume that both and are measured in the same monetary units. A natural interpretation is that is the monetary value to user of a rate allocation , and is a monetary cost for congestion at the link when the total allocated rate is .
We make the following assumptions regarding and . Assumption 1: For each , over the domain the utility function is concave, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable, and the right directional derivative at 0, denoted , is finite. Assumption 2: There exists a continuous, convex, strictly increasing function over with , such that for :
Thus, is strictly convex and strictly increasing. Concavity in Assumption 1 corresponds to elastic traffic, as defined by Shenker [25] ; such traffic includes file transfers such as FTP connections and peer-to-peer connections. Note that Assumption 2 does not require the price function to be differentiable. Indeed, assuming smoothness of would simplify some of the technical arguments in the paper. However, we later require the use of nondifferentiable price functions in our proof of Theorem 8.
Given complete knowledge and centralized control of the system, a natural problem for the network manager to try to solve is the following [4] : SYSTEM maximize (1) subject to (2) Since the objective function (1) is continuous, and increases at most linearly while increases superlinearly, an optimal solution exists for (1), (2); since the feasible region is convex and is strictly convex, if the functions are strictly concave, then the optimal solution is unique. We refer to the objective function (1) as the aggregate surplus; this is the net monetary benefit to the economy consisting of the users and the single link [5] . For convenience, we define a function surplus which gives the aggregate surplus at an allocation surplus
Due to the decentralized nature of the system, the resource manager may not have an exact specification of the utility functions [4] . As a result, we consider the following pricing scheme for rate allocation. Each user makes a payment (also called a bid) of to the resource manager. Given the vector , the resource manager chooses a rate allocation . We assume the manager treats all users alike-in other words, the network manager does not price differentiate. We will assume that is measured in the same monetary units as both and . In this case, given a price , user acts to maximize the following payoff function over :
The first term represents the utility to user of receiving a rate allocation equal to ; the second term is the payment made to the manager. Observe that since utility is measured in monetary units, the payoff is quasilinear in money, a typical assumption in modeling market mechanisms [5] .
Notice that as formulated before, the payoff function assumes that user acts as a price taker; that is, user does not anticipate the effect of his choice of on the price and, hence, on his resulting rate allocation . Informally, we expect that in such a situation the aggregate surplus will be maximized if the network manager sets a price equal to marginal cost, i.e., if the price function satisfies (6) According to the following proposition a joint solution to (4) and (6) can always be found; the proof is straightforward, and details may be found in [24] . This proposition is then used to show that when users optimize (5) and the price is set to satisfy (6), aggregate surplus is maximized.
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Given any vector of bids , there exists a unique pair satisfying (4) and (6) , and in this case is the unique solution to: (7) Furthermore, has the following properties: 1) ; 2) is continuous for ; 3) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of ; and 4) as .
Observe that we can view (7) as a market-clearing process. Given the total revenue from the users, the link manager chooses an aggregate rate so that the revenue is exactly equal to the aggregate charge . Due to Assumption 2, this market-clearing aggregate rate is uniquely determined. Kelly et al. present two algorithms in [3] which amount to dynamic processes of market-clearing; as a result, a key motivation for the mechanism we study in this paper is that it represents the equilibrium behavior of the algorithms in [3] . Kelly et al. show in [3] that when users are nonanticipating, and the network sets the price according to (4) and (6), the resulting allocation solves SYSTEM. This is formalized in the following theorem, adapted from [3] .
Theorem 2 (Kelly et al., [3] ): Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For any , let be the unique solution to (4) and (6) . Then there exists a vector such that , and (8) For any such vector , the vector solves . If the functions are strictly concave, such a vector is unique.
Theorem 2 shows that with an appropriate choice of price function (as determined by (4) and (6)), and under the assumption that the users behave as price takers, there exists a bid vector where all users have optimally chosen their bids , with respect to the given price ; and the aggregate surplus is maximized at this "equilibrium." However, when the price taking assumption is violated, the model changes into a game and the guarantee of Theorem 2 is no longer valid. We investigate this game in the following section.
II. SINGLE LINK GAME
We now consider an alternative model where the users of a single link are price anticipating, rather than price taking, and play a game to acquire a share of the link. Throughout the remainder of this section and the next, we will assume that the link manager sets the price according to the unique choice prescribed by Proposition 1, as follows.
Assumption 3: For any , the aggregate rate is the solution to (7):
. Furthermore, for each , is given by if if (9) Note that we have and if and, hence, is always well defined. We adopt the notation to denote the vector of all bids by users other than , i.e.,
. Given , each user chooses to maximize (10) over nonnegative . The payoff function is similar to the payoff function , except that the user now anticipates that the network will set the price according to Assumption 3, as captured by the allocated rate . A Nash equilibrium of the game defined by is a vector such that for all for all (11) In the next section, we show that a Nash equilibrium always exists, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for a vector to be a Nash equilibrium. In Section II-B, we outline a class of price functions for which the Nash equilibrium is unique.
A. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we establish that a Nash equilibrium exists for the game defined by . We start by establishing certain properties of in the following proposition. Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then: 1)
is a continuous function of ; and 2) for any , is strictly increasing and concave in , and as . Proof: We first show 1): that is a continuous function of . Recall from Proposition 1 that is a continuous function of , and . Now at any vector such that , we have , so ; thus continuity of at follows by continuity of and . Suppose instead that , and consider a sequence such that as . Then, as , from parts 1) and 2) of Proposition 1; since for all , we must have as , as required.
We now show 2): that is concave and strictly increasing in , with as . From Assumption 3, we can rewrite the definition of as if if (12) From this expression and Proposition 1, it follows that is strictly increasing in . To show as , we only need that as , a fact that was shown in Proposition 1.
It remains to be shown that for fixed , is a concave function of . Since we have already shown that is continuous, we may assume without loss of generality that . We will only consider the case where is twice differentiable; the extension to general uses a simple limiting argument, and details can be found in [24] . When is twice differentiable, it follows from (7) that is twice differentiable in . Since , we can differentiate (12) twice to find From Proposition 1, is a strictly concave function of ; thus the last term in the sum above is nonpositive. To show that is concave in , therefore, it suffices to show that the sum of the first two terms is negative, i.e., (13) By differentiating both sides of (7), we find that From (7), we have Substituting these relations, and noting that since is strictly increasing, we conclude that (13) holds, as required. Thus is concave in , as long as is twice differentiable.
The previous proposition establishes concavity and continuity of ; this guarantees existence of a Nash equilibrium, as the following proposition shows. The proof is an application of Rosen's existence theorem [26] ; details may be found in [24] .
Proposition 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game defined by .
In the remainder of this section, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a vector to be a Nash equilibrium. Because the price function may not be differentiable, we will use subgradients to describe necessary local conditions for a vector to be a Nash equilibrium. Since the payoff of user is concave, these necessary conditions will in fact be sufficient for to be a Nash equilibrium. We begin with some concepts from convex analysis [27] , [28] . An extended real-valued function is a function ; such a function is called proper if for all , and for at least one . We say that a scalar is a subgradient of an extended real-valued function at if for all , we have . The subdifferential of at , denoted , is the set of all subgradients of at . Finally, given an extended real-valued function , we denote the right directional derivative of at by and left directional derivative of at by (if they exist). If is convex, then , provided the directional derivatives exist.
For the remainder of this paper, we view any price function as an extended real-valued convex function, by defining for . Our first step is a lemma identifying the directional derivatives of as a function of ; for notational convenience, we introduce the following definitions of and , for : (14) Note that under Assumption 2, we have for . Lemma 5: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, for all with , is directionally differentiable with respect to . These directional derivatives are given by (15) 
Furthermore, , and if then . Proof: Existence of the directional derivatives is obtained because is a concave function of (from Proposition 3). Fix a vector of bids, such that . Since is an increasing concave function of , and the convex function is directionally differentiable at (see [28, Th. 23 .1]), we can apply the chain rule to compute the right directional derivative of (7) with respect to Thus, as long as , exists, and is given by
We conclude from (9) that the right directional derivative of with respect to is given by Simplifying, this reduces to (15) . Note that since and , we have . A similar analysis follows for the left directional derivative.
For notational convenience, we make the following definitions for :
Under Assumption 2, we have for . The next proposition is the central result of this section: It provides simple local conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a vector to be a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by , if and only if , and with , , the following two conditions hold for all :
Conversely, if and satisfy (18) , (19) , and , then the vector is a Nash equilibrium with and . Proof: We first show that if is a Nash equilibrium, then we must have . Suppose not; then for all . Fix a user ; for , we have , which approaches infinity as . Thus, , and thus we have
In particular, an infinitesimal increase of strictly increases the payoff of user , so cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Thus, if is a Nash equilibrium, then . Now, let be a Nash equilibrium. We established in Lemma 5 that is directionally differentiable in for each , as long as . Thus, from (11), if is a Nash equilibrium, then the following two conditions must hold:
if We may substitute using Lemma 5 to find that if is a Nash equilibrium, then if Since the condition is identical to the condition , this establishes the conditions in the proposition. Conversely, if and the preceding two conditions hold, then we may reverse the argument: since the payoff function of user is a concave function of for each (from Proposition 3), (18) , (19) are sufficient for to be a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that and satisfy (18), (19) , with . Then let . We then have (since ); and , so that . Since , we have , so that . Thus, is a Nash equilibrium, as required. Note that the preceding proposition identifies a Nash equilibrium entirely in terms of the allocation made; and conversely, if we find a pair which satisfies (18), (19) with and , then there exists a Nash equilibrium which yields that allocation. In particular, the set of allocations which can arise at Nash equilibria coincides with those vectors such that , and (18), (19) are satisfied.
B. Nondecreasing Elasticity Price Functions: Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we demonstrate that for a certain class of differentiable price functions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game defined by . We consider price functions which satisfy the following additional assumption.
Assumption 4: The price function is differentiable, and exhibits nondecreasing elasticity: For , there holds
To gain some intuition for the concept of nondecreasing elasticity, consider a price function satisfying Assumption 2. The quantity is known as the elasticity of a price function [5] . Note that the elasticity of is the derivative of with respect to . From this viewpoint, we see that nondecreasing elasticity is equivalent to the requirement that is a convex function in . (Note that this is not equivalent to the requirement that is a convex function of .)
Nondecreasing elasticity can also be interpreted by considering the price function as the inverse of the supply function ; the supply function gives the amount of rate the provider is willing to supply at a given price [5] . In this case, nondecreasing elasticity of the price function is equivalent to nonincreasing elasticity of the supply function.
Nondecreasing elasticity captures a wide range of price functions; we give two common examples that follow. , and is an integer. Then, the price is set proportional to the probability that an M/M/1 queue exceeds a buffer level , when the service rate is and the arrival rate is . In this case we have , so that satisfies Assumption 4. We now prove the key property of differentiable nondecreasing elasticity price functions in the current development: For such functions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game defined by . Proposition 7: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. If in addition is differentiable and exhibits nondecreasing elasticity (Assumption 4 holds), then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the game defined by . Proof: We use the expressions (18), (19) to show that the Nash equilibrium is unique under Assumption 4. Observe that in this case, from (17) (21)]. Now note that the right-hand side of (20) is strictly larger at than at ; thus the left hand side must be strictly larger at than at as well. This is only possible if for each user , since we have shown in the preceding paragraph that ; is nonincreasing as increases; and . Since , we have which is a contradiction. Thus, at the two Nash equilibria, we must have , so we can let , , and . Then, all Nash equilibria satisfy if (22) if (23) However, now we observe that the left hand side of (22) is strictly decreasing in , so given , there exists at most one solution to (22) . Since , this implies the Nash equilibrium must be unique.
We observe that uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium implies an additional desirable property in the case of symmetric users. If two users share the same utility function, and the price function is differentiable, we conclude from Proposition 7 that at the unique Nash equilibrium, these users submit exactly the same bid (and, hence, receive exactly the same rate allocation).
We also note that in general, Nash equilibria need not be unique. As an example, consider a case with two users, where , for . Let the price function be for , and for . Then, it is straightforward to verify that any pair such that for , and , satisfies (18), (19) with ; thus, by Proposition 6, there exist Nash equilibria that correspond to each of these . Note, however, that the price function is not differentiable; it is not clear whether, in general, differentiability of suffices to guarantee a unique Nash equilibrium.
III. EFFICIENCY LOSS: THE SINGLE LINK CASE
We let denote an optimal solution to SYSTEM, defined in (1), (2) , and let denote any Nash equilibrium of the game defined by
. We now investigate the efficiency loss of this system; that is, how much aggregate surplus is lost because the users attempt to "game" the system? To answer this question, we must compare the aggregate surplus obtained when the users fully evaluate the effect of their actions on the price, and the aggregate surplus obtained by choosing an allocation which maximizes aggregate surplus. The following theorem is the main result of this paper: It states that the efficiency loss is no more than approximately 34%, and that this bound is essentially tight. where surplus is defined in (3) . In other words, there is no more than approximately a 34% efficiency loss when users are price anticipating. Furthermore, this bound is tight: For every , there exists a choice of , a choice of (linear) utility functions , , and a (piecewise linear) price function such that a Nash equilibrium and a solution to SYSTEM exist with surplus surplus (25) Proof: The proof of (24) consists of a sequence of steps.
1) We show that the worst case ratio occurs when the utility function of each user is linear. 2) We restrict attention to games where the total allocated Nash equilibrium rate is . 3) We compute the worst case choice of linear utility functions, for a fixed price function and total Nash equilibrium rate . 4) We prove that it suffices to consider a special class of piecewise linear price functions. 5) Combining steps 1)-3), we compute the worst case efficiency loss by minimizing the ratio of Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to maximal aggregate surplus, over the worst case choice of games with linear utility functions [from step 2)] and our restricted class of piecewise linear price functions [from step 3)].
Step 1: Show that we may assume without loss of generality that is linear for each user , i.e., without loss of generality we may assume , where and for
. The proof of this claim is similar to the proof of [23, Lemma 4] . Let denote any solution to , and let denote a Nash equilibrium, for an arbitrary collection of utility functions satisfying the assumptions of the theorem. We let denote the allocation vector at the Nash equilibrium. For each user , we define a new utility function , where ; we know that by Assumption 1. Then, observe that if we replace the utility functions with the linear utility functions , the vector remains a Nash equilibrium; this follows from the necessary and sufficient conditions of Proposition 6.
We first show that . To see this, note from (19) that for all such that . Thus, for such a user , so , by convexity (Assumption 2). Next, we note that . This follows since is strictly increasing and nonnegative, while ; thus if is sufficiently small for all , we will have , which implies (since is a solution to SYSTEM). Using concavity, we have for each that . Defining and expanding the definition of surplus , we have surplus surplus (Note that all denominators are positive, since we have shown that .) Since we assumed , we have by concavity; and since , we have the inequality Now, observe that the right hand side of the previous expression is the ratio of the Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to the maximal aggregate surplus, when the utility functions are ; since this ratio is no larger than the same ratio for the original utility functions , we can restrict attention to games where the utility function of each user is linear. Finally, by replacing by , and the cost function by , we may assume without loss of generality that . Thus, by relabeling the users if necessary, we assume for the remainder of the proof that for all , where and for . Before continuing, we observe that under these conditions, we have the following relation:
To see this, note that at any fixed value of , the left hand side is maximized by allocating the entire rate to user 1. Thus, the ratio of Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to maximal aggregate surplus becomes (26) Note that the denominator is positive, since ; and further, the optimal solution in the denominator occurs at the unique value of such that .
Step 2: Show that we may restrict attention to games where the total allocated rate at the Nash equilibrium is . Fix a cost function satisfying Assumption 2. Let be a Nash equilibrium, and let be the resulting allocation. Let be the total allocated rate at the Nash equilibrium; note that by Proposition 6. We now define a new price function according to , and a new cost function ; note that . Then, it is straightforward to check that satisfies Assumption 2. We will use hats to denote the corresponding functions when the price function is : , , , , etc. Define
. Then we claim that is a Nash equilibrium when the price function is . First observe that ; thus . Furthermore, . Finally, note that from which we conclude that , and similarly . Recall that is a Nash equilibrium for the price function ; thus, if we combine the preceding conclusions and apply Proposition 6, we have that is a Nash equilibrium when the price function is , with total allocated rate and allocation . To complete the proof of this step, we note the following chain of equalities:
where we make the substitution . But now note that the right hand side is the ratio of Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to maximal aggregate surplus for a game where the total allocated rate at the Nash equilibrium is equal to 1. Consequently, in computing the worst case efficiency loss, we may restrict our attention to games where the Nash equilibrium allocated rate is equal to 1.
Step 3: For a fixed price function , determine the instance of linear utility functions that minimizes Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus, for a fixed Nash equilibrium allocated rate . Note that fixing the price function fixes the optimal aggregate surplus; thus minimizing the aggregate surplus at Nash equilibrium also yields the worst case efficiency loss.
We will optimize over the set of all games where users have linear utility functions [satisfying the conditions of step 1)], and where the total Nash equilibrium rate is . We use the necessary and sufficient conditions of Proposition 6. Note that by fixing the price function and the total rate , the Nash equilibrium price is fixed, , and and are fixed as well [from the definition (17)]; for notational convenience, we abbreviate , , , and for the duration of this step. Since , for a fixed value of the game with linear utility functions that minimizes aggregate surplus is given by solving the following optimization problem (with unknowns ):
minimize (27) subject to (28) if (29) (30)
(Note that we have applied Proposition 6: if we solve the preceding problem and find an allocation and coefficients , then there exists a Nash equilibrium with .) The objective function is the aggregate surplus given a Nash equilibrium allocation . Conditions (28) and (29) are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium conditions established in Proposition 6. The constraint (30) ensures that the total allocation made is equal to 1, and the constraint (31) follows from Step 1. The constraint (32) ensures the rate allocated to each user is nonnegative.
We solve this problem through a sequence of reductions. We first show we may assume without loss of generality that the constraint (29) holds with equality for all users . The resulting problem is symmetric in the users ; we next show that a feasible solution exists if and only if and is sufficiently large, and we conclude using a convexity argument that at an optimal solution. Finally, we show the worst-case occurs in the limit where , and calculate the resulting Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus.
We first show that it suffices to optimize over all such that (29) holds with equality for . Note that if is a feasible solution to (27)-(32), then from (29)-(32), and the fact that , we conclude that . Now, if for some , but the corresponding constraint in (29) does not hold with equality, we can reduce until the constraint in (29) does hold with equality; by this process, we obtain a smaller value for the objective function (27) . On the other hand, if for some , we can set ; since , this preserves feasibility, but does not impact the term in the objective function (27) . Therefore, we can restrict attention to feasible solutions for which (33)
Having done so, observe that the constraint (31) that may be written as Finally, the constraint (31) that becomes redundant, as it is guaranteed by the fact that [from (30)], (by definition), and (33).
We now use the preceding observations to simplify the optimization problem (27) 
The objective function (34) equals (27) upon substitution for for , from (33). We know that when [from (28) and (29)]; thus the constraint (35) is equivalent to the constraints (28) and (29) for user 1 with . The constraint (28) for is redundant and eliminated, since (29) holds with equality for . The constraint (36) is equivalent to the allocation constraint (30); and the constraint (37) ensures , as required in (31). We first note that for a feasible solution to (34)-(38) to exist, we must have . We have already shown that we must have if a feasible solution exists. Furthermore, from (35) we observe that the smallest feasible value of is . We require from (36) and (38), so we must have , which yields the restriction that . Thus, there only exist Nash equilibria with total rate 1 and price if:
We will assume for the remainder of this step that (39) is satisfied.
We note that if is a feasible solution to (34)-(38) with users, then letting , the vector is a feasible solution to (34)-(38) with users, and with the same objective function value (34) as . Thus, the minimal objective function value cannot increase as increases, so the worst case efficiency loss occurs in the limit where . We now solve (34)-(38) for a fixed feasible value of . From the constraints (36), (37), we observe that a feasible solution to (34)-(38) exists if and only if the following condition holds in addition to (39):
In this case, the following symmetric solution is feasible:
Furthermore, since the objective function is strictly convex and symmetric in the variables , and the feasible region is convex, the symmetric solution (41) must be optimal.
If we substitute the optimal solution (41) into the objective function (34) and take the limit as , then the constraint (40) is vacuously satisfied, and the objective function becomes . Since we have shown that , the worst case occurs at the smallest feasible value of ; from (35), this value is (42)
The resulting worst case Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus is
To complete the proof of the theorem, we will consider the ratio of this Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to the maximal aggregate surplus; we denote this ratio by as a function of the price function (43) Note that henceforth, the scalar used throughout step 3) will be denoted , and we return to denoting the price function by . Thus, as defined in (43) is a function of the entire price function . For completeness, we summarize in the following lemma an intermediate tightness result which will be necessary to prove the tightness of the bound in the theorem.
Lemma 9: Suppose that assumptions 2) and 3) are satisfied. Then, there exists and a choice of linear utility functions , where , with total Nash equilibrium rate 1, if and only if (39) is satisfied, i.e.,
In this case, given , there exists and a collection of users where user has utility function , such that is a Nash equilibrium allocation with , and (45)
Proof of Lemma: The proof follows from step 3). We have shown that if there exists a Nash equilibrium with total rate 1, then (44) must be satisfied. Conversely, if (44) is satisfied, we proceed as follows: Define according to (42); choose large enough that (40) is satisfied; define according to (41); and then define according to (33) with . Then, it follows that is a feasible solution to (27)-(32), which (by Proposition 6) guarantees there exists a Nash equilibrium whose total allocated rate equals 1. The bound in (45) then follows by the proof of step 3).
The remainder of the proof amounts to minimizing the worst case ratio of Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to maximal aggregate surplus, over all valid choices of . A valid choice of is any price function such that at least one choice of linear utility functions satisfying the conditions of step 1) leads to a Nash equilibrium with total allocated rate 1. By Lemma 9, all such functions are characterized by the constraint (44). We will minimize , given by (43), over all choices of satisfying (44).
Step 4: Show that in minimizing over satisfying (44), we may restrict attention to functions satisfying the following conditions:
Observe that as defined in (46)-(48) is a convex, strictly increasing, piecewise linear function with two parts: an initial segment which increases at slope , and a second segment which increases at slope . In particular, such a function satisfies Assumption 2. Furthermore, we have , so that . This implies ; thus, multiplying through (48) by yields (44). To verify the claim of step 4), we consider any function such that (44) holds. We define a new price function as follows:
(49) (See Fig. 1 for an Of course, and , so that (44) is satisfied for . Let denote the cost function associated with . Observe that (by convexity of ), we have for all that , so that . Thus Furthermore, so that . Next, we let denote the cost function associated with . By convexity of , we know for ; thus in that region. We let . Then, we have the following relationship:
The last equality follows by observing that since , the solution to occurs at where ; and at all points , we have the relationship . Combining the preceding results, we have , as required.
Step 5: The minimum value of over all satisfying (46)-(48) is
. We first show that given satisfying (46)-(48), is given by
The numerator results by simplifying the numerator of (43), when takes the form described by (46)-(48). To arrive at the denominator, we note that the solution to occurs at satisfying . Since , we must have and . Simplifying, we find (51)
The expression , upon simplification, becomes the denominator of (50), as required.
Fix and such that , and , and define as in (46). We note here that the constraints and may be equivalently rewritten as , and . Define ; from (50), note that for a fixed , is a ratio of two affine functions of , and thus the minimal value of is achieved either when or as . . This completes the proof of (24), the lower bound in the theorem.
We now show that this lower bound is tight. Fix . The preceding argument shows that the worst case occurs for price functions satisfying (46)-(48), where and . For fixed , let be the associated price function defined according to (46) . Then, we have established that From Lemma 9, we know there exists such that , and where is the ratio of Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus to maximal aggregate surplus for some game with price function and total allocated rate 1 at the Nash equilibrium. We thus have Thus, for sufficiently large, we will have , establishing (25) .
Theorem 8 shows that in the worst case, aggregate surplus falls by no more than approximately 34% when users are able to anticipate the effects of their actions on the price of the link. Furthermore, this bound is essentially tight. In fact, from the proof of the theorem we see that this ratio is achieved via a sequence of games where the following hold true.
1) The price function has the form given by (46)-(48), with , , and .
2) The number of users becomes large . 3) User 1 has linear utility with , and all users have linear utility with , where (for ). The last item follows by substituting the solution (41) in (33), and taking the limit as . (Note that formally, the limits of and should be taken in the correct order; in particular, in the proof we first have , and then .) Note that the price function used to achieve the worst case efficiency loss is not differentiable. As discussed in Section I, this is the main reason that we allow nondifferentiable price functions in Assumption 2. Indeed, some of the results of Section II-A can be simplified if we restrict attention only to differentiable price functions. Nevertheless, we note that even if we only consider differentiable price functions, the worst case efficiency loss remains approximately 34%. This result can be established by approximating the piecewise linear price functions described in (46)-(48) by differentiable price functions.
It is interesting to note that the worst case is obtained by considering instances where the price function is becoming steeper and steeper at the Nash equilibrium rate 1, since . This forces the optimal rate at the solution to SYSTEM to approach the Nash equilibrium rate , as we observe from (51); nevertheless, the shortfall between the Nash equilibrium aggregate surplus and the maximal aggregate surplus approaches 34%.
IV. INELASTIC SUPPLY VERSUS ELASTIC SUPPLY
In this section, we briefly compare the model of this paper (allocation of a resource in elastic supply) with the model of [23] (allocation of a resource in inelastic supply). In [23] , a model is considered with a single link having exactly units of rate available to allocate among the users. As in the model of this paper, user submits a bid . The link manager then sets a price ; and user receives an allocation given by if if
As in this paper, the payoff to user is . It is shown in [23] that when users are price anticipating and the link supply is inelastic, the efficiency loss is at most 25% of the maximal aggregate utility.
Intuitively, we would like to model a system with an inelastic supply by a cost function which is zero for , and infinite for . Formally, we show in this section that if the price function is given by for and , then as the worst case efficiency loss approaches 25%-the same value obtained in [23] . While this does not formally establish the result in [23] , the limit is intuitively plausible, because as the exponent increases, the price function and associated cost function begin to resemble an inelastic capacity constraint with : For , as
; and for , as . Proof: We follow the proof of Theorem 8. Steps 1)-4) follow as in that proof, provided we can show that two scalings of the function do not affect our result-in step 1), where we replace by , and in step 2), where we replace by , where is the Nash equilibrium rate. Indeed, both these scalings remain valid, since the rescaled price function is still a monomial with the same exponent as , but a different constant coefficient. In particular, we may continue to restrict attention to the special case where , with , and where the total Nash equilibrium allocated rate is 1. . This implies for all , so is strictly increasing for .
Next, we consider . Note first that . Furthermore, as , , and . Thus, as . Finally, let ; it suffices to show is strictly increasing for . Differentiating yields
As before, it suffices to check that , where . We have ;
; and . Thus, for all , which implies is strictly increasing for . From the previous lemma, we conclude that the minimum value of over satisfying (57) is given by ; this establishes (55). As in Theorem 8, by construction this bound is tight, so (56) holds as well.
The preceding theorem shows that for a particular sequence of price functions which approach an inelastic supply constraint, the efficiency loss gradually decreases from 7/27 (at ) to 1/4 (as ). In the limit as , we recover the same efficiency loss as in the earlier work of [23] . However, while we have demonstrated such a limit holds as long as the price functions are monomials, there remains an open question: If the price functions "converge" (in an appropriate sense) to a fixed capacity constraint, under what conditions does the efficiency loss also converge to 1/4? It is straightforward to check that such a limit cannot always hold. For example, consider price functions of the form specified in (46)-(48). Using the expression for given in (50), it is possible to show that by first taking , and then taking , the worst case efficiency loss approaches zero; see (53).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper considers a pricing mechanism where the available resources in a network are in elastic supply. For a game where users' strategies are the payments they are willing to make, we showed that the efficiency loss is no more than 34% when users are price anticipating, for the setting of a single link (Theorem 8).
This result can be extended to general networks, using the same approach as in [23] . We consider a standard multicommodity flow model, where each user has multiple paths available, and each path uses a subset of links in the network. The utility to a user depends on the maximum rate at which he can send through the network. We study a game where users submit individual bids to each link in the network; it is straightforward to establish existence of a Nash equilibrium for such a game. Using techniques similar to the results proven in a network context in [23] , it can be shown that the efficiency loss is no more than 34% when users are price anticipating, matching the result of Section III. For details of this network extension, the reader is referred to [24] and [29] .
Important questions remain regarding an extension of this work to a dynamic context. While our results suggest that ma-nipulation of the market in a static game setting cannot lead to arbitrarily high efficiency loss, such a result does not necessarily imply users will not be able to manipulate an algorithmic implementation of this mechanism (such as those proposed in [3] ).
Investigation of this point is an open research topic.
Critical to any investigation of dynamics is the nature of the information available to the players of the pricing game. In order to compute an optimal strategic decision users need to know not only the current price level , but also the total allocated rate and the derivative of the price (where we have assumed for simplicity that is differentiable). We postulate that the overhead of actually collecting such detailed information in a large scale communication network is quite high; in fact, in general users do not have knowledge of either the total allocated rate or the derivative of the price at the resource. This raises an important question of information availability when users respond to price signals: users may not react optimally, so what are the users' conjectures about how their strategies affect the price? Developing more detailed models for the users' response to available price information from the network is a research direction for the future.
